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INTRODUCTION

After velvet and violent revolutions swept through Eastern Europe1, the security of each
state collapsed as well. Hated Soviet hegemony evaporated and a security vacuum grew to
encompass post-communist Europe. This paper considers the conflicts emerging within and
between states in the eastern half of Europe and the policy dilemmas for Western democracies
in light of these dangers.
Preceding 1989 events were years of political repression and fraudulent economic
performance--decades during which anti-regime attitudes intensified and alternative societies
grew in even the most severe police states. 2
The ripening of resentment toward both party elites and Soviet hegemony, combined with
the courage of peoples within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the weakening of the
USSR itself, eroded communistpower. Their abject surrender of state control was a magnificent
st9ry. about which we marveled as walls fell, playwrights became president, and tyrants were
overthrown.
As understandable as our euphoria in 1989 may have been, however, it was premature.
No one can now doubt that building new political and socioeconomic structures in countries long
ruled by communist parties requires, first, tearing down remnants of Leninist institutions. Even
more pressing, however, is the difficult task of excising the norms of rigid authoritarianism and
state ownership from individual and group behavior.
The resuscitation of Eastern Europe is not, then, "merely" a process of socioeconomic

1

or political development.

These countries cannot simply begin on the road towards

socioeconomic and political recovery from where they were.

A prerequisite is a rapid,

purposeful destruction of structures from a one-party system and from a state-owned, centrallyplanned economy.
A preliminary diagnosis of Eastern Europe in the wake of revolution confronts a
dangerous paradox. Leninist parties' failure and precipitous retreat--seen by some as a "victory"
of the West in the Cold War--have left populations that are well educated, advanced and cultured
in the midst of severely weakened socioeconomic and political institutions. Notwithstanding
their understandable pride and high expectations, East Europeans will ·almost certainly run
headlong into the limitations of nascent post-communist systems.
These are proto-democracies of a post-communist sort. They occupy a peculiar subset
of all political systems wherein movement towards a rule of law, free and competitive elections
and other fundamental tenets of democratic polities have been inaugurated after the collapse of
Leninist dictatorships. Yet, further progress towards such objectives is far from being secure.
As weak political systems in a threat-rich environment, the countries of Eastern Europe
confront diversified external dangers and intensified internal challenges. At the same time, the
West's efforts to reinforce East European proto-democracies have been belated and desultory.
During the next decade, the dichotomy between the needs of post-communist Europe and the
strategic vision of the West may lead to disastrous consequences for both.
POST-COMMUNIST GOALS

Eastern Europe's first generation of post-communist political leaders must concentrate
their energies on developing a new basis for national security, institutionalizing political
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democracy and creating a free market. These inextricably intertwined issues trouble
Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel as much as Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev. No leader
can ensure a stable democracy, a prosperous free market economy, or a threat-free security
environment without achieving all three goals at once. Yet, none of these goals can be achieved
absent a substantial cost extracted from progress toward the others.
Pursuing all three goals simultaneously is necessary but destabilizing. The urgency of
building a free market economy is understood by everyone, for example. Yet trying to institute
a fully convertible currency, free prices from government control, dismantle central planning,
open up domestic markets to foreign products, and sell state-owned assets are all measures that
engender severe short-term effects on living standards.
In a tragic irony, many of the citizens who keenly sought an end to communist rule-peasants and industrial workers, for example--are among those whose lives are most harmed by
economic dislocation of marketization. Non-competitive factories close, unemployment rapidly
escalates, and the prices of goods and services skyrocket well beyond the means of industrial
or agricultural labor.

Strikes by displaced workers, protests by urban consumers, and

parliamentary deadlocks over issues of socioeconomic policy have escalated and more are likely.
If market reforms are implemented in an open political environment, where freedom of
expression and association are being observed but where broadly-based parties through which
competing interests might be coalesced are still underdeveloped, marketization itself may
endanger proto-democracies. 3
Similarly, few observers disagree that the egregious weight of military effort in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union , contributed -to poor economic performance and popular
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antagonism. 4 To de-militarize security, however, may require a confrontation between newly
installed non-communist leaders and those who have held the reins of national security for
decades. There is little room for compromise. Either the civilian leaders wrest control of
national security policy, the military budget, and defense industry weapons development and
production, or civil authorities lose a critical battle. The only alternative to such conflict is an
implicit bargain that leaves the national security agenda outside the competence of democratic
politics--an outcome that can be debilitating if discovered by a population much too weary from
years of intra-elite deals.
External security for fledgling post-communist democracies is closely linked to the
resolution of internal disputes between civil and military authorities. The demise of the Warsaw
Pact in 1991, applauded in Eastern Europe and the West, nevertheless leaves questions about
how external threats to the region will be identified and countered. Except for Poland, none of
these states is sufficiently large and advanced to mount a credible conventional defense against
a concerted attack. Under what security umbrella, and supported by which security guarantees,
will Eastern Europe enter the twenty-first century?
The principal tasks confronting post-communist. governments of Eastern Europe in the
1990s--security, democracy and market--are neither benign nor quiescent. As much as they are
each necessary pillars for a "Europe whole and free", achievements in all three domains will
extract political and socioeconomic costs from policy makers and populations, with success far
from certain.
CHALLENGES OF PROTO-DEMOCRACIES

Progress towards each of the goals noted above requires surmounting five principal

I
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hurdles that dissipate capacities of proto-democracies in Eastern Europe: Ethnonationalism, the
political costs of marketization, bureaucratic opposition from the residual communist

nomenklatura and secret police, uncertain civil-military relations, and the political apathy of the
populace towards authority.
Most debilitating for Southeastern Europe--the Balkans, pnncipally--is ethnonationalism.
A virulent symbiosis between ethnic identity and intolerant chauvinism, ethnonationalism has
brought conflagration to Yugoslavia, and threatens to spread.
Yugoslavia's tragic path towards dissolution began long before events of 1989 in the rest
of Eastern Europe; the federation's artificial creation at Versailles after World War I brought
together an amalgam of antagonistic nations, formerly provinces of the disintegrating AustroHungarian and Ottoman empires, into a fragile state.

After World War II, Yugoslavia's

multiplicity of languages, religions and socioeconomic conditions were held together by fear of
Soviet intervention, by the Yugoslav People's Army and League of Yugoslav Communists, and
by Josef Broz Tito's own charismatic authority.
While Tito's death in 1980 did not lead to immediate political turmoil, economic
deterioration, corruption, and widening inequalities soon exacerbated schisms among
nationalities. 5 Politicians, especially Serbian communist President Slobodan Milosevic, were
ready and willing to take up the cause of their nation's grievances and fanned the flames of
ethnic conflict. The fast-growing Albanian population in Yugoslavia, concentrated in the Serbian
province of Kosovo and in the Macedonian republic, was a target of particularly inflammatory
Milosevic rhetoric during 1989-90.
In 1991, Yugoslavia slipped over the precipice toward which it had edged during the
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1980s. Serbs and Croats began their wanton self-destruction in the summer of 1991, even as
Slovenia moved away on its own hard-won independent course while other republics and ethnic
groups waited nervously for violent outbreaks and Army intervention. 6 For Albanians, who
constitute 90 percent of the population in the province of Kosovo in southern Serbia, a virtual
state of military occupation prevails already. 7 Unless the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the Western European Union (WEU) has the will and capacity
to form a multinational peacekeeping force to separate combatants in Croatia, Kosovo, and
elsewhere, it is certain that the 1990s will be tragically violent throughout Yugoslavia. 8
Romania and Bulgaria exhibit a strong potential for ethnonationalist unrest as well. In
Romania, the Hungarian and Gypsy minorities are the largest, with the rights of perhaps two
million Hungarians in Transylvania remaining a principal inter-state issue between Bucharest and
Budapest. 9 An unsavory Romanian nationalist organization, Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian
Hearth or Cradle), has tried to exploit anti-minority sentiment, with vitriol directed against
Hungarians, Jews, and Gypsies. Cooler heads in the Romanian and Hungarian governments seek
to diminish the sensitivity of this issue. The Romanian Ministry of Culture, for example, issued
a statement in late July, 1991 condemning the nationalist extremism of several publications10 ,
while Prime Minister Roman reportedly was considering banning "racist, chauvinistic and
nationalist" publications including Vatra's "Romania Mare" . 11 Militaries of the two countries
have taken steps (such as a symbolic "Open Skies" confidence and security-building agreement)
to defuse tensions. 12

Turks in Bulgaria (who account for 10 % or more of the total population) represent a
large proportion of the young work force and the army's conscript pool. A recent and disturbing
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record of Bulgarian-Turkish inability to coexist peacefully in the Bulgarian state was evident
during the last decade of communist rule. Under Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian communist
government tried to obliterate the Turkish identity by, for example, forcing individuals to adopt
Bulgarian surnames. These and other harsh measures precipitated a violent backlash, followed
by army intervention, and a mass exodus by more than 300,000 Turks in the summer of 1989
that further destabilized the Bulgarian economy and hastened the end of Zhivkov's regime. 13
These are the most volatile cases of ethnonationalism, but they are not alone. The
fiendishly complex interweaving of peoples and borders in East-Central and Southeastern Europe
involves a diaspora for almost every nation--Poles in Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine,
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Romania and two Yugoslav republics, Germans in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Romania and the USSR, and so on. 14

Even in a case such as Sudeten

Germans in Czechoslovakia--an issue that Hitler utilized malevolently in 1938, but one that
involves few people alive today--has made a Czechoslovak-German treaty far more controversial
because of demands that Prague compensate families for lost property and grant people and their
heirs a right to resettle. 15 And,_ any steps by the Federal or Czech Republic governments to
acknowledge German claims exacerbates already fragile ties with Slovakia, where Slovak
nationalism is moving that republic inexorably towards separation from the federation. 16
Perhaps most irreparable is the issue of what Macedonia is or should be--a dispute involving
every nationality and state within the Balkans. 17 As one of the oldest and most intractable of
this litany of ethno-nationalist disputes, Macedonia may yet emerge as a matter about which
Balkan regional peace breaks down.
Poland and Hungary exemplify the conditions that attend the rapid and fundamental shift
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towards a free market economy. Freeing prices, selling state-owned property, and making the
currency convertible send waves of dislocation throughout the economy; these wrenching
changes leave many enterprises, and a high proportion of the work force, out of an economy
where profitability determines employment. 18 Admonitions from Western economists to
persevere in the face of daunting recessions are little solace to workers in Lodz, Katowice or
NowaHuta.
Poland's dramatic turn towards a market economy was inaugurated in January, 1990 by
former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Finance Minister Balcerowicz. That they were
willing and able to launch such a rapid abandonment of a state-controlled economy was due to
their enormous popularity at that time, and the legitimacy of the first non-communist Polish
government since the 1940s. 19
Mazowiecki's government eroded its political legitimacy as elements of a market
economy were put into place. Work stoppages by miners and railway workers in May 1990
were the first sign that the government's radical economic policies were not being well received
by industrial labor. In the months before the late 1990 presidential election, extreme fringes of
the political spectrum who were dissatisfied with the government's economic program coalesced
around Stanislaw Tyminski--a wealthy emigre who had returned from living in Peru and Canada.
Tyminski outpolled Mazowiecki in this first truly post-communist election, but lost to former
Solidarity leader Lech Walesa in the runoff election. Walesa also played to people's
dissatisfaction with the country's economic transformation, never defining his own policies
clearly, but always suggesting that he would be the best guardian of the workers' interests. 20
That Walesa has allowed and even encouraged criticism of Balcerowicz brought about, by the
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fall of 1991, the Finance Minister's decision not to run again for Parliament.
Poland is much further along in moving to a market economy than are its East European
neighbors. By July 1991, the reservoir of positive sentiment towards government policy had
evaporated; 81 % interviewed for one national survey said that living standards of Poles were
bad, and 76% thought people "are becoming poorer" . 21 Simultaneously, strikes spread to key
sectors such as transportation, while budget deficits rose, requiring a 15 % budget cut by the
Bielecki government. The Prime Minister offered his resignation in August, 1991, which was
refused by Walesa; but the costs of shifting to a market economy are being absorbed daily by
the post-communist governments of Poland. 22
A broader point applies to the entire eastern half of Europe. Even in the best of cases
such as Hungary--where ample foreign investment has poured into the country--inflation has
risen from about 29% in 1990 to a projected 38% in 1991. Czechoslovak unemployment rose
20% in one month (June to July, 1991), reaching 4.6% of the workforce, while annual inflation
for 1991 was projected to hit 61 %.23
In much worse shape is Bulgaria, where another 40% hike in food costs in mid-summer,
1991 led Prime Minister Dimitar Popov to contemplate government intervention to hold the line
on prices. 24 A strike by miners and another by 80% of all the country's medical personnel
were only two of the most serious labor disputes in late summer, 1991, propelled not only by
price increases, but also by perceived governmental inattention to the plight of workers. 25
Creating a market economy is not devoid of conflict. Broadly consensual movements that
had opposed communist rule break down into competing groups and strata once the unambiguous
adversary--communism--has been defeated and narrow economic interests are introduced.
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Publics seem to support strongly the notion of a free market economy, but at the same time
appear to reject individual responsibility for each citizen's well-being, emphas~ze the
contributions made by socialism, and urge cautious change."26 Solidarity- has broken apart in
Poland, and_ the Union of Democratic Forces that toppled communists in Bulgaria has now split
into two factions broadly "representing" more laizze faire versus social democrat orientations.
For each proto-democracy, a challenge also arises from within--from the stratum of_

nomenklatura who occupied significant local and national posts throughout the communist
period, and from the secret police establishments that underpinned every communist regime.
Arrests, "retirements", ·and departures to other countries have been routes by which those who
administered communist party rule have been removed from responsible positions. But there
are too many people in too many critical jobs to extract all of them. For at least a generation,
people who have been active in the administration of communist party governments will remain
embedded throughout East European proto-democracies.
The unavoidable consequence of such a personnel challenge for post-communist Eastern
Europe is a diminished efficacy of decision-makers. Although this problem is most evident in
Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, prime ministers in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary must
also confront the recalcitrant implementation of their market-oriented, Western-style policies
from within ministries, local governments, research institutes, courts and other institutions.
And, quite apart from reluctance, there is also purposeful sabotage of non-communist
governments' policies--by adherents to old Leninist parties, by right-wing extremists, and by the
old secret police for whom ideology is less important than power and prerogatives. 27
Another obstacle strewn in the path of fledgling East European systems is the uncertain
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boundary between civil and military authority. With the exception of the Czechoslovak army,
none of the militaries in East-Central and Southeastern Europe stayed out of politics earlier in
the century. In cases such as the Bulgarian army, coups or plots became a leitmotif of preWorld War II activity. 28
During the post-World War II decades, all of the region's armies were intertwined with
ruling communist parties.

At first, the army was the communist party in Yugoslavia and

Albania in 1945, while in other states the "people's" army became, bracketed by Soviet troops,
an ultimate guarantor of communist power. Each East European military benefitted greatly
during these decades, with unbridled access to manpower and material resources to the detriment
of both society and economy. 29
But today, where are do the loyalties of erstwhile communist militaries lie? Given that
internal and external threats to states in this corridor of Europe seem to be intensifying, we can
presume that military leaders would oppose budget reductions and drastic cuts in their order of
battle.
Unemployment pressures further argue against cutbacks in defense industries; in Slovakia,
for example, retaining an active production line for T-72 tanks was seen as a test for the
economic policies of the federal government in Prague and as an issue of Slovak autonomy.
President Havel, federal Prime Minister Calfa and other officials defended foreign sales,
including an agreement to provide several hundred tanks to Syria, on the basis of such economic
necessity. 30
Positive signs emerged in 1991 that East European civil authorities were obtaining
necessary cooperation from general staffs and defense industrial managers to restructure forces

11

and cut back weapons. In some cases where resistance to cutbacks was apparent, wholesale
generational shifts have been implemented in the officer corps; major Bulgarian military
commands were changed in mid-1991, for example, with replacements usually being younger,
with Western experience in 1990-91.31
The most dangerous and intractable challenge for Eastern Europe may be the apathy
and/or antipathy people have towards politics. 32 After almost forty five years of one-party
authoritarianism following earlier decades of depression and war, there is no collective memory
of how a democratic polity functions; the active engagement of citizens is needed more in these
new systems than in any state where democracy has firm roots.
Czechoslovakia alone managed to maintain an inter-war democracy, but was unable to
break from the orthodox communist mold after the 1968 Soviet invasion ended the Prague
Spring. Poland and Hungary had transitional "reform" periods while still nominally ruled by
communists in which alternative associations and economic activity became widely accepted.
But even in those two cases, not to mention the Balkan states, public political life was muted for
so long that individuals lost any sense that the system would respond to their needs or solve their
problems. Creating a legitimate, self-sustaining public political sphere, that is,one not dependent
on mobilization, out of a population that sees political authority as corrupt and irrelevant, is a
formidable task. The depth of such a problem was suggested by a recent survey in Poland that
found 71 percent of respondents agreeing that "corruption in Poland is a major problem" .33
A damaging consequence of such popular assessments is a purposeful apathy towards
public life and political authority.
subservience.

This is · not merely an apathy born of ignorance or

Rather it is a rejection of involvement because of a perceived futility.
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In

Hungarian by-elections during 1991, results were voided because of 17% turnout. 34 In one
national sample, 34 % of Hungarians surveyed said that they were unlikely to vote, and another
third said voting was only "probable".

35

Given these obstacles, achieving the three principal goals of East European postcommunist systems appears remote. A wholly negative assessment, however, would err greatly.
We ought not ignore the talents and courage of the region's peoples, their awareness of what
failure would imply (i.e., a return to conditions in which their rights are denied and sovereignty
threatened), the useable economic infrastructure upon which a recovery can build, and the
West's considerable interest in avoiding worst-case scenarios.
Unless all of these obstacles to security, democracy and market can be overcome,
however, the consequences for Eastern Europe during the next decade will be disquieting.
EASTERN EUROPE 2001

Within the coming decade, East-Central and Southeastern Europe are certain to exhibit
political instability of varying degrees. Such turmoil may take peaceful forms in the northern
part of this corridor, with consequences ranging from high turnover rates among cabinet-level
officials, frequent governmental resignations, persistent work stoppages and student protests, and
related events.
Such an unsettled environment is not incompatible with a nascent democracy. Provided
that the resolution of each new crisis enables structures and processes of free governments and
free economies to become further institutionalized, the first decade of post-communism may see
the cathartic effects of systemic "cleansing" take place.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the five laender of Germany that had been the

13

German Democratic Republic are all certain to undergo periods during which dangerous shoals
are not far away. Polish President Walesa has chaffed under the constraints of an early 1990
"Round Table" agreement that assured communists a majority in the Sejm (parliament), and
made vague threats about dissolving parliament in spring 1991 when the deputies would not
accept his proposal for a new electoral law. 36 At the same time that such political uncertainty
persists, the Polish economy continues its tortuous shift towards capitalism with vital signs mixed
to say the least. 37 Institutions on which Poles had long relied such as Sol1darity have begun
to lose support, and the popularity of a national hero such as Lech Walesa deteriorates. 38
But there are certainly factions within each country that will seek to exploit unrest in
order to advance their extremist cause-~of nationalist intolerance, of militarism, or theocracy.
Although far from certain, a second scenario is thus much more disturbing; in such an
environment, post-communist systems will edge towards a slippery slope down which lies
disaster for the region and for Europe. Substantial intra-state violence, albeit at levels less than
civil war--including frequent assassinations, killing of protesters by police and military units,
clashes among ethnic groups, and similar episodes--would indicate that the precipice is not far
away.
Once over the precipice, a limited civil war may begin between ethnic groups with
territorial claims, or between those trying to promote the extremism of one political organization
versus another.

The Yugoslav case exhibits an ethnonationalist civil war, exacerbated by

socioeconomic and political divisions. Irredenta in the Balkans could easily spark fighting that,
while failing to reach levels of open conventional warfare, nevertheless, costs thousands of lives.
Yugoslavia's limited civil war now focused on fighting between Serbs and Croats cannot
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be controlled from within the former federal state or by indigenous institutions.

Combat

between Slovenes and Serbs may not be part of this round of fighting, but Slovenia would surely
be drawn back into an all-Yugoslav conflagration39 , as would the Albanians in Kosovo,
Macedonia, and all the surrounding states.
An inter-state conflict short of war, included armed confrontations at borders, trade
wars, rupture of diplomatic relations and mutual threats and accusations can follow from the
spread of civil war or be driven by other interests. Limited potential for this scenario exist
between many combinations of states--between Albania and Serbia, Turkey and Bulgaria,
Albania and Greece, Romania and Hungary, Poland and Germany, Poland and Byelorussia, the
Ukraine or Lithuania, and elsewhere.
A large-scale inter-state war remains a horrible, yet thankfully dim possibility. Neither
the wherewithal for sustained inter-state warfare nor the political capacity to inaugurate such
combat exists in Eastern Europe.

Yet, the considerable anxiety of countries bordering on

Yugoslavia concerning the intentions of the federal (largely Serbian-led) Yugoslav army could
precipitate a much wider conflict; the Albanian government, for instance, issued a warning in
early August, 1991 of a "second front" in Kosovo, and put its army on alert against Serbian
incursions. 40 It is this remote, but unnerving fear that sent European leaders scurrying in a
desperate search for an avenue, via CSCE, EC or other mechanisms, away from war in
Yugoslavia.
WESTERN INTERESTS

Doubts about Eastern Europe's relevance to U.S. interests arise if one ignores the
continuing potential for cataclysms in the eastern half of Europe (including the USSR west of
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the Urals) to endanger American security. Data on intra-European conflict portray a continent
that has only in the last two generations ceased to be the world's killing field4 1--an image we
so often +be to the underdeveloped world. And, even in the absence of wars between major
powers, ci+il war, terrorism, secessionist movements, and political repression have killed
j

hundreds of thousands since World War II. History may not repeat itself. But we would be
i

foolish to a~sume that European and American security will be, now and in the future, immune
I

from threa~s that arise from conflicts having their origins in Eastern Europe.
Becluse Cold War bipolarity is gone, the certainties of those decades are no more. We
I

now see a llussian heartland from which we hear members of the "Soyuz" political faction and
I

I

military H~gh Command saying that reformist policies lost Eastern Europe, intend to end
socialism rd to dismantle the USSR. 42 At the same time, a reunified Germany understandably
I

I

extends it~ economic predominance toward the east which, notwithstanding Germany's
I

democracy), is discomfiting to Polish and Hungarian nationalists.

The role of other major

powers nebessitates U.S. and European Community involvement both to enhance regional
security jd to ensure that de-facto dominance is not reasserted from any direction.
I

M*y of the hostilities deeply embedded within Eastern Europe involve direct,
longstandilg NATO and U.S. interests. That Bulgaria and Greece have developed, since the
late 1980slI a de facto alliance. versus Turkey matters because any conflict would harm both the
North At1ktic
alliance and American interests in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.
I
I

Bu} it also matters that destabilizing migration could easily result from a wider civil war
in YugosJvia,
from bloodshed in Albania, ethnic conflict in Bulgaria, or catastrophic economic
I
conditions! in Poland, Romania or elsewhere. Already Albanians have overwhelmed Italian ports

I
i
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and Greek border crossings43 , illegal Romanian emigration has become a problem at borders
throughout Central Europe44 , Poles have streamed into Germany, and Russians, Ukrainians and
others from the USSR may have similar inclinations. If Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, and
Turkey were all affected negatively by unrest in Eastern Europe, becoming less stable or secure
themselves, then U.S. security would have suffered a grievous loss.
Economic dislocations due to such intra-European migration are likely to be severe and
prolonged. The costs of social services provided to refugees, housing shortages created by their
influx, and a tightening job market are all sure to be immediate consequences; simultaneously,
countries from which people flee could be stripped of industrial or agricultural labor as well as
the educated elite.
Were violence to be an imminent cause of such flight, guerilla bands may seek sanctuary
in neighboring states, inviting "hot pursuit" by a state's armed forces. The specter of hostages,
cross-border terrorism, and other unstable conditions would quickly return to Europe.
At the core of our concern about Eastern Europe, however, must lie principles that we
and our European allies have long sought for peoples who were ruled by communist parties.
As enunciated in the 1975 Helsinki Accord, and enlarged by the CSCE Charter of Paris in 1990,

all of the Euro-Atlantic region must be governed by the same standards of international and
domestic conduct. Security for individuals, groups, nations and states within Europe's eastern
half cannot be regarded as. less vital than elsewhere from the Atlantic to the Urals. To the
degree that the U.S. and Western Europe pay less attention to intra-national unrest in a Balkan
country vis-a-vis France, Italy or Spain, the whole fabric of a "Europe whole and free" is
weakened.
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AN AGENDA
The United States, its European allies and Japan should become fully engaged in East
Europe's quest for security, democracy and market. Our tasks are to help these post-communist
systems surmount the obstacles that may preclude an uninterrupted pursuit of such goals. Our
own economic and security interests demand such attention and effort.
The United States has, of course, joined in the new European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), headquartered in London, to spur the market transition of East
European (and Soviet) economies. "Support for East European Democracy" (SEED) legislation
has funded new U.S. Agency for International Development programs in Eastern Europe, while
the Peace Corps, the National Endowment for Democracy and other federally-funded efforts
have channeled developmental assistance into both socioeconomic and political projects. These
endeavors, coupled with those of other governments and innumerable private foundations,
institutes, and businesses have meant an ample supply of Western advice, start-up technical
assistance, and small grants to entrepreneurs, scholars and others.
-

But the economic underpinnings of proto-democracies require much more. The United
States and the European Community should increase considerably East European access to
Western markets by raising or ending import quotas on key products such as textiles. 45 Action
·in that direction is underway in the U.S. Congress for the northern tier countries of Eastern
Europe, and should be applied to the Balkan states as well. We should advocate doubling the
capitalization of the EBRD, now atjust above $12 billion--ofwhich the U.S. share would be no
more than $1.2 billion--and end our adamancy about denying credits for public sector projects.
Debt swaps should be encouraged as American policy, tax incentives should be provided to
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American companies that invest in Eastern Europe, and COCOM restrictions should be much
less restrictive.
And, in the realm of security, the United States must quickly reassess its insistence that
CSCE play a role secondary to NATO in securing Europe. The Helsinki process has now
matured sufficiently, given the end of an East-West confrontation, to warrant a far different
status for U.S. and Western security planning. In human rights and confidence and securitybuilding, CSCE has proved to be a flexible and durable forum, instrumental in bringing about
changes in Europe during the 1980s. In the 1990s--beginning at the Helsinki "II" meeting in
March, 1992--the CSCE should begin its metamorphosis into a new Euro-Atlantic Security
Organization.
The need for a truly Euro-Atlantic security architecture is palpable. Former Warsaw Pact
members are unlikely candidates for NATO membership; such a step would be precisely the
provocation sought by anti-reform, anti-democratic elements on the Soviet scene.

In the

Yugoslav crisis, neither the EC nor its security arm, the Western European Union, was able to
create any decisive policy, other than to send in unarmed truce observers. The CSCE did little
more, but was the only forum in which every state--includingthe U.S. and USSR--was present.
But out of the current minimal CSCE structure, much more is required. The Conflict
Prevention Center in Vienna should be invested with far greater authority, symbolized by
ambassadorial rank representation, and it should become forum vested with the potential to
utilize peace-keeping forces. It ought to have the power to insist on mediation of disputes, with
economic sanctions as an enforcement mechanism. The CSCE Secretariat ought to be expanded
considerably, planning for CSCE annual summits that bring together foreign and defense
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ministers of all Atlantic to the Urals states. And the CSCE should receive a mandate to move
forward on innovative confidence and security-building measures, particularly in the East
European corridor, including bilateral "open skies" arrangements, de-militarized zones along
borders, and many other efforts to raise transparency and lessen uncertainties.

SUMMARY
A "new world order" and a "Europe whole and free" are phrases that epitomize the
hopeful rhetoric born of East European revolutions in 1989. In the two years since we we!e
awed by the courage of citizens disgusted with communist party rule, and surprised by the
rapidity of such regimes' demise, socioeconomic and political realities have dimmed hopes and
constrained expectations. The work of building free governments and free markets from decades
of neglect and abuse faces East Europeans in the 1990s and beyond.
The dangers suggested above are not hyperbole, and represent real and present threats
to the hopes of Poles, Romanians, etc. for better futures. Comparisons across the region are
much less valid than at any time in the last half century. Nevertheless, the goals of postcommunist leaders--security, democracy and market--face similar extraordinary challenges that
can easily derail these processes.

Americans and our longstanding allies cannot ensure the

survival and further development of East European democracy, but we must certainly be more
engaged in helping them help themselves.
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generally, to political entities from the Baltic to Black to Adriatic seas, in regions that are
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6.
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August, 1991).
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8.
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1991, and mechanisms for its action were incomplete or rudimentary. See, for example, Judy
Dempsey, "CSCE Does Its Best to Rise to the Occasion", Financial Times (9 August, 1991) and
Ariane Genillard, "CSCE Will Attempt to Convene Peace Talks on Yugoslavia", Financial
Times (8 August, 1991).
9.
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10.

See this Ministry statement published in Romania Libera (24 July, 1991), p. 1.

11.

RFE/RL Daily Report, #150 (August 8, 1991), p. 2.

12.
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13.
A brief synopsis of the anti-Turkish measures by Zhivkov and their consequences was
Gunter Lerch, "Fur viele eine Flucht in Ungewisse . . . ", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
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Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1990).
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17.
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18.
For example, the five eastern laender of Germany (the former GDR) reached an
unemployment level of 12.1 % by July, 1991, with prospects that a level of 15% would be
reached by the end of the year. July data were reported in RFE/RL Daily Report #150 (8
August, 1991), p. 3.
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19.
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Information Agency Research Memorandum series (July 15, 1991 and July 12, 1991,
respectively).
For example, Bulgarian Radio on August 4, 1991 accused "middle level, communist
27.
nomenklatura" of having "set off . . . price increases in order to hamper economic reform".
See RFE/RL Daily Report (Number 149, August 7, 1991), p. 3.
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